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Generic statements (e.g., ‘‘Lions have manes’’) make claims about kinds (e.g., lions as a category) and, for
adults, are distinct from quantificational statements (e.g., ‘‘Most lions have manes’’), which make claims about
how many individuals have a given property. This article examined whether young children also understand
that generics do not depend purely on quantitative information. Five-year-olds (n = 36) evaluated pairs of
questions expressing properties that were matched in prevalence but varied in whether adults accept them as
generically true (e.g., ‘‘Do lions have manes?’’ [true] vs. ‘‘Are lions boys?’’ [false]). Results demonstrated that
children evaluate generics based on more than just quantitative information. Data suggest that even young
children recognize that generics make claims about kinds.
A central task of early childhood is to learn broad
generalizations about categories in the world. Chil-
dren must learn that lions have manes, milk builds
strong bones, and stoves are hot. Generic sentences
such as ‘‘Lions have manes’’ provide an important
means of conveying such knowledge (Gelman,
2003). Generics make claims about kinds (e.g., lions
as a category) rather than individuals (e.g., the lions
at the zoo) and express generalizations about
shared properties of category members (Carlson,
1977; Carlson & Pelletier, 1995). Generics also link
to core properties, as they express predicates that
are relatively enduring (not transient), timeless (not
contextually bound), and inherent (not accidental)
(Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Prasada, 2000; see also
Prasada & Dillingham, 2006). Generics appear fre-
quently in natural speech, including conversation
with young children (e.g., Gelman, Goetz, Sarnecka,
& Flukes, 2008), and they have been hypothesized
to play a central role in human reasoning (Gelman,
2003; Prasada, 2000). Nevertheless, an issue that
remains unresolved concerns how the meaning of
these utterances is represented.
Within the linguistic and philosophical litera-
tures, there has been considerable debate over how
to characterize the semantics of generics (for a
review, see Leslie, 2008). Leslie (2007, 2008) has
argued that the truth of a generic statement does not
depend on how many kind members possess the
property in question; there is no straightforward
mapping between statistical facts about the world
and judgments about generics (see also Carlson,
1977; Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; cf. Prasada & Dill-
ingham, 2006). Consider these examples. ‘‘Lions
have manes’’ is true, but ‘‘Lions are male’’ is false,
even though only male lions ever possess manes.
‘‘Mosquitoes carry the West Nile Virus’’ is true,
even though less than 1% of mosquitoes are actually
infected. Conversely, ‘‘People are right-handed’’ is
false, despite the fact that the vast majority of indi-
viduals are right-handed. Examples such as these
demonstrate that when deciding on the truth value
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of a generic, people rely on more than just statistical
information.
Recent empirical work confirms that, for adults,
generic meaning does not reduce to quantification—
that is, to considerations of how many members of
the kind have the property. Two main findings
have emerged from this research. First, adults’
acceptance of generics is not accounted for by the
prevalence of the predicated properties alone. (It is
only in certain circumscribed cases that statistical
frequency is sufficient to make a generic true;
Prasada & Dillingham, 2006, 2009.) For example,
Khemlani and colleagues (Khemlani, Leslie, &
Glucksberg, 2009; Khemlani, Leslie, Glucksberg, &
Rubio-Fernandez, 2007) showed that adults judged
some generics such as ‘‘Ducks lay eggs’’ and ‘‘Mos-
quitoes carry the West Nile virus’’ to be true
despite knowing that a large percentage of the
kinds lacks the predicated properties; however,
they rejected other generics such as ‘‘Books are
paperbacks’’ and ‘‘Canadians are right-handed’’
despite knowing that most members of those kinds
have the predicated properties. Furthermore,
Cimpian, Brandone, and Gelman (2010) found that
adults were willing to accept even some novel
generics (e.g., ‘‘Lorches have purple feathers’’) at
low prevalence levels (below 50%).
Second, research has shown that adults’ accep-
tance of generics reflects biases in their conceptual
representations. For example, Cimpian, Brandone,
et al. (2010) found that generic predications of prop-
erties that were described as distinctive or danger-
ous (e.g., venomous scales) were accepted more
often than generic predications of other similar
properties (e.g., shiny scales), presumably because
properties that are either distinctive or dangerous
to humans are privileged in our kind representa-
tions (see also Leslie, 2007, 2008). Similarly, Cim-
pian, Gelman, and Brandone (2010) and Gelman
and Bloom (2007) showed that considerations about
the nature and origin of the predicated properties
(e.g., whether they are innate vs. acquired) are suffi-
cient, independently of prevalence, to determine how
adults reason about generic sentences.
Together, these data suggest that, at least for
adults, generics do not reduce to quantificational
statements. An important remaining question is
whether this is also the case for children: Do chil-
dren understand generic meaning as distinct from
quantification? This question has important impli-
cations for broader theoretical questions regarding
the nature of children’s concepts. Some have
argued that as young children build their lexical
and conceptual repertoires, they are guided by
abstract conceptual knowledge (e.g., ontology,
animacy, function), including a conceptual distinc-
tion between individuals and kinds (e.g., Carey,
1985, 2009; Gelman, 2003; Gelman & Brandone,
2010; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Wellman & Gelman,
1998). However, others have proposed a more
bottom-up process of lexical and conceptual devel-
opment in which perceptual features of the envi-
ronment get linked to concrete linguistic features of
the input via associative learning (e.g., Colunga &
Smith, 2005; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004; Sloutsky,
Kloos, & Fisher, 2007; Smith, Jones, & Landau,
1996). These theoretical perspectives offer distinct
proposals for how children might interpret gener-
ics. If children’s concepts go beyond the available
evidence and incorporate abstract knowledge, then
children may be able to interpret generics as being
about abstract kinds and as distinct from state-
ments about how many members of the kind have
the relevant property. If, on the other hand, chil-
dren’s cognition is limited to statistical computa-
tions and associative learning, then children may
instead interpret generics as synonymous with
quantified statements.
Much of the recent evidence regarding children’s
production and comprehension of generics is sug-
gestive of the possibility that generics are not
equivalent to statements about frequency even for
young children. Children as young as 2½ years of
age produce generics (Gelman, Goetz, et al., 2008;
Gelman, Waxman, & Kleinberg, 2008) and do so
more often when the context encourages a focus on
kinds (Brandone & Gelman, 2009; Gelman, Goetz,
et al., 2008; Gelman, Waxman, et al., 2008). For
example, preschoolers produce more generics when
talking about animals than artifacts (Brandone &
Gelman, 2009; Gelman, Goetz, et al., 2008; Gelman,
Waxman, et al., 2008)—consistent with evidence
suggesting that animal categories are more richly
structured and ‘‘kind-like’’ than artifact categories
(e.g., Keil, 1989). These data suggest that children
understand generics to be making claims about
kinds. However, production data are ambiguous:
When children produce a generic (e.g., ‘‘Birds fly’’),
we cannot be certain whether they are referring to
the kind or to a quantified set (e.g., all or most birds).
So far, the evidence from comprehension studies
also cannot definitively rule out the possibility that
children understand generics as quantificational.
Preschoolers seem to recognize that generics (a)
refer beyond individuals in the immediate context
(Cimpian & Markman, 2008; Cimpian, Meltzer, &
Markman, 2011; Gelman & Bloom, 2007; Gelman &
Raman, 2003), (b) are broad in scope but allow for
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exceptions (Chambers, Graham, & Turner, 2008;
Gelman & Bloom, 2007), and, more specifically, (c)
imply scope that is intermediate between ‘‘all’’
and ‘‘some’’ (Hollander, Gelman, & Star, 2002).
Although these studies demonstrate sophisticated
understanding of generics in preschoolers, their
results are still compatible with the possibility that
children interpret generics as equivalent to quantifi-
cational statements about individuals (e.g., perhaps
as equivalent to ‘‘most’’ statements).
Thus, existing data provide suggestive, but not
conclusive, evidence that children do not interpret
generics as making purely quantificational claims.
In the current experiments, we examine this ques-
tion directly. Specifically, we ask: Do young chil-
dren interpret generics as reflecting only statistical
facts about the world? Or, as in the case of adults,
do judgments about the truth of generics depend
on additional information?
Study 1
We compared children’s judgments about pairs of
statements that, although matched in prevalence,
vary in their acceptability as generics. Consider, for
example, ‘‘Lions have manes’’ versus ‘‘Lions are
male.’’ Since only male lions have manes, ‘‘Lions
have manes’’ applies to at most as many lions as
‘‘Lions are male.’’ Yet, despite the similar underlying
statistics of these two statements, only ‘‘Lions have
manes’’ seems acceptable, arguably because having
manes is a characteristic property of the kind lion,
whereas being male is not. The question of what
makes a property characteristic of a kind is an
exceedingly complex one (see Leslie, 2007, 2008;
Prasada & Dillingham, 2006, 2009). For current pur-
poses, a property was deemed ‘‘characteristic’’ if it
involved (a) a salient physical property (e.g., ‘‘Lions
have manes’’), (b) a means of gestation (e.g., ‘‘Birds
lay eggs’’), or (c) a means of nurturing the young
(e.g., ‘‘Pigs give milk to their babies’’). A property
was deemed ‘‘noncharacteristic’’ if it involved attrib-
uting a gender to the kind (e.g., ‘‘Lions are male’’).
Theoretically, this does not exhaust all the possibili-
ties for characteristic versus noncharacteristic prop-
erties; nevertheless, these were the guidelines
selected to operationalize characteristic and non-
characteristic properties in the current study.
The previous example illustrates the research
strategy used in this study: We compared the likeli-
hood that participants would accept as true each of
two kinds of statements presented in generic form:
(a) those for which predicates are characteristic of the
kind yet true of only one gender (e.g., ‘‘Lions have
manes’’) and (b) those for which predicates are not
characteristic of the kind yet also true of only one gen-
der (e.g., ‘‘Lions are boys’’). (Note that because of the
age of our participants, we substituted the terms boys
and girls for males and females. Pilot testing con-
firmed that children understood these terms as refer-
ring to the gender of the animals and did not
interpret them to mean human boys and human girls.)
Pairs of characteristic and noncharacteristic state-
ments (e.g., ‘‘Lions have manes’’ vs. ‘‘Lions are
boys’’) were chosen such that, within each pair, the
property predicated in the noncharacteristic state-
ment (e.g., being male) served as a precondition for
the property predicated in the characteristic state-
ment (e.g., having a mane) and thus applied to a
superset of the animals to which the characteristic
property applied. To ensure that participants were
aware of these inclusion relations, we tested their
knowledge of the gender requirements for the
properties predicated in the characteristic state-
ments (e.g., ‘‘Do boy lions have manes?’’ ‘‘Do girl
lions have manes?’’). Only items on which partici-
pants demonstrated requisite knowledge (e.g., that
only boy lions have manes) were analyzed.
By equating the prevalence of the information
expressed in the two types of statements and vary-
ing whether or not the predicated property was
characteristic of the kind, we could distinguish
responses driven by prevalence information from
responses driven by knowledge about kinds. If chil-
dren interpret generics as reflecting purely statisti-
cal facts about the world, they should be equally
likely to accept the characteristic and noncharacter-
istic statements because the properties predicated
in each are roughly equivalent in prevalence. If, on
the other hand, children interpret generics as claims
about kinds like adults do, then they should be
more likely to accept the characteristic than the
noncharacteristic statements. We predicted that
children’s understanding of generics would not be
driven solely by statistical facts about the world;
thus, acceptance of the characteristic items should
be greater than acceptance of the noncharacteristic
items.
Method
Participants
Fourteen children (7 males, 7 females; M =
5.36 years, SD = .52) and 14 undergraduates (5
males, 9 females) participated. Two additional chil-
dren were excluded because they did not know any
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of the gender properties. An additional 28 under-
graduates participated in pretesting (see below).
Children were recruited from schools in a Midwest-
ern city. Undergraduates were recruited from the
subject pools at two large public universities. Par-
ticipants were predominantly European American
and from middle-income homes.
Materials and Procedure
Part 1. Participants evaluated the truth or falsity
of 20 items presented in question form (e.g., Do
lions have manes?) in one of four semirandom orders.
Participants responded by answering definitely yes,
definitely no, or a little yes, a little no. The a little yes,
a little no response was included to increase the
sensitivity of the measure by creating a midpoint
response, which allowed participants to show
doubt about an item without completely rejecting
it. Answer choices corresponded to pictures of a
thumb pointing up, down, and sideways. To moti-
vate the task, children were asked to help an alien
learn about animals on Earth. Children responded
by pointing to the thumb pictures. Undergraduates
responded to written questions by circling the
appropriate thumb images.
Items consisted of six characteristic and nonchar-
acteristic item pairs (see Table 1). Within each pair,
the characteristic item expressed a property that is
characteristic of the target kind yet present in only
one gender (e.g., ‘‘Do lions have manes?’’). This
gender information then served as the predicate for
the corresponding noncharacteristic item (e.g., ‘‘Are
lions boys?’’). Because the property predicated in
each noncharacteristic item was a precondition for
the property predicated in the corresponding char-
acteristic item, characteristic and noncharacteristic
properties were roughly equivalent in prevalence
(see the Adult Pretests section below). Eight filler
items with clear, obvious answers were also
included (four characteristic, four noncharacteristic;
see Table 1) to screen out children who did not
understand the task. The filler items expressed
properties that are also considered characteristic
(e.g., ‘‘Do tigers have stripes?’’) or noncharacteristic
(e.g., ‘‘Do dogs have wings?’’) of their target kind;
however, because in all cases the properties in these
filler items are present or absent in both genders
and thus do not allow for prevalence-matched com-
parison items, these items were not included in our
central analyses. Children responded correctly to
the vast majority of the filler items (M = 97.3%).
Every child answered all or all but one of the filler
items correctly.
Part 2. In this part, we tested participants’
knowledge of the gender requirements for the char-
acteristic properties (e.g., that only male lions have
manes). Participants were asked about 10 proper-
ties: 6 characteristic properties (from Part 1) that
apply to individuals of only one gender, 2 filler
properties that apply to individuals of both genders
(e.g., both boy and girl tigers have stripes), and 2
filler properties that do not apply to individuals of
either gender (e.g., neither boy nor girl dogs have
wings). Participants were asked separate, sequential
questions about whether these properties apply to
the males and females of the species (e.g., ‘‘Do boy
lions have manes? Do girl lions have manes?’’).
Question pairs were presented in one of four semi-
random orders. Whether the female or male version
of the question appeared first was counterbalanced
across subjects.
Participants responded by answering definitely
yes, definitely no, or a little yes, a little no. Children
pointed to indicate their answer to a second alien’s
questions about ‘‘boy animals and girl animals.’’
Undergraduates circled the appropriate thumb
image. If participants responded incorrectly to a
Part 2 question, that item pair was excluded from
their Part 1 data. Responses were considered
incorrect if participants answered either of the
Table 1
Study 1: Part 1 Items
Item type Item
Characteristic Do birds lay eggs?a
Do pigs give milk to their babies?a
Do horses grow their babies in their
tummies?
Do lions have manes?a
Do deer have antlers?
Do goats have horns?a
Noncharacteristic Are birds girls?a
Are pigs girls?a
Are horses girls?
Are lions boys?a
Are deer boys?
Are goats boys?a
Filler Do tigers have stripes?
Do cats have tails?a
Do kangaroos hop?
Do cows say moo?a
Do dogs have wings?
Do snakes have feet?a
Do hamsters fly
Do fish say woof?a
aIndicates items used in Study 2.
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questions incorrectly (e.g., saying that boy lions do
not have manes or that girl lions do). To be con-
servative, the intermediate answer choice was
counted as a negative response. Both children and
undergraduates knew the majority of the facts
tested in Part 2 (MChildren = 4.07 of 6 possible;
MUndergraduates = 4.93).
Adult pretests. To confirm that the predicates of
the characteristic and noncharacteristic items are
considered equally prevalent, we conducted two
pretests with separate groups of undergraduates. In
the first, 16 undergraduates estimated the preva-
lence of the properties (e.g., having manes, being
male) used in the main task. For example, partici-
pants were told, ‘‘It is estimated that there are
roughly 32,000 individual lions in the world. Please
estimate what percentage of those individual lions
have manes.’’ Participants estimated the character-
istic and noncharacteristic properties to be roughly
equal in prevalence, F(6, 10) = 0.39, p = .87, apply-
ing to an average of 54.3% and 49.6% of category
members, respectively.
In the second pretest, a separate group of 16
undergraduates performed a comparative judgment
for each item pair. They were asked, for example,
‘‘Which do you think there are more of? (a) Boy
lions; (b) Lions that have manes; (c) They are equal.’’
Across all item pairs, the dominant response was
‘‘They are equal.’’ Participants selected this response
on 67.7% of trials, significantly more often than
expected by chance (33.3%), t(15) = 3.54, p = .003.
Participants selected the characteristic response
(e.g., ‘‘Lions that have manes’’) on 6.3% of trials (sig-
nificantly less likely than expected by chance),
t(15) = 12.84, p < .001, and the noncharacteristic
response (e.g., ‘‘Boy lions’’) on 26.0% of trials (at
chance levels), t(15) = 0.72, p = .49. Overall, pretest
results confirmed that adults consider the character-
istic and noncharacteristic properties to be roughly
equal in prevalence.
Results
Our central analysis involved the proportion of
definitely yes responses for the characteristic and
noncharacteristic items. We conducted a 2 (item
type: characteristic, noncharacteristic; within sub-
ject) · 2 (age group: children, undergraduates;
between subjects) analysis of variance (ANOVA).
The dependent variable was a proportion score
based on the number of times participants selected
the definitely yes response out of the total number of
item pairs on which they demonstrated requisite
knowledge in Part 2.
Results revealed the predicted main effect of
item type, F(1, 26) = 34.22, p < .001, gp
2 = .57. As
shown in Table 2, both children, F(1, 13) = 11.27,
p = .002, gp
2 = .30, and undergraduates, F(1, 13)
= 24.16, p < .001, gp
2 = .48, gave significantly more
definitely yes responses for characteristic than non-
characteristic items. (The proportion of definitely no
and a little yes, a little no responses are also dis-
played in Table 2.) This pattern of results held for
10 of 14 children, p = .012, and 11 of 14 under-
graduates, p = .006 (sign tests). Results also
revealed a nonsignificant trend toward an effect of
age group, F(1, 26) = 3.23, p = .084, gp
2 = .11, with
children tending to choose definitely yes more often
than undergraduates (Ms = 0.61 and 0.43, respec-
tively).
Additional analyses were conducted to compare
the proportion of definitely yes responses against
rates expected by chance (.33, Table 2). As pre-
dicted, for the characteristic items both children,
t(13) = 6.20, p < .001, and undergraduates, t(13) =
4.37, p = .001, selected the definitely yes response at
rates greater than expected by chance. This was not
the case for the noncharacteristic items. Children,
t(13) = 1.41, p = .18, and undergraduates, t(13) =
1.24, p = .24, selected the definitely yes response for
these items at chance levels.
Table 2
Mean Proportion (Standard Deviation) of Responses by Response Type, Age Group, and Item Type
Study Age group Item type
Proportion of responses (SD)
Definitely yes A little yes, A little no Definitely no
1 Adult Characteristic .65 (.28)* .35 (.28) .00 (.00)*
Noncharacteristic .21 (.36) .78 (.35)* .01 (.04)*
Children Characteristic .76 (.26)* .17 (.24)* .07 (.19)*
Noncharacteristic .46 (.35) .47 (.37) .07 (.20)*
2 Children Characteristic .86 (.33)* .03 (.10)* .11 (.30)*
Noncharacteristic .29 (.45) .71 (.45)* .00 (.00)*
*Indicates p < .05 for comparisons against chance (.33).
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Discussion
Study 1 addressed the question of whether
young children equate generics with quantification
by comparing children’s true and false judgments
about pairs of statements that, although matched in
prevalence, vary in whether or not they are consid-
ered acceptable generics by adults. Results showed
that children were more likely to accept generics
that express characteristic than noncharacteristic
properties. These findings suggest that young chil-
dren do not interpret generics as statements about
the number or proportion of individual category
members that possess a particular property.
Instead, even young children recognize that gener-
ics make claims about kinds.
The argument that children do not interpret
generics as equivalent to quantification rests on the
finding that children were less likely to reply defi-
nitely yes to the noncharacteristic items. We argue
that children did so because they (a) recognize that
generics make claims about kinds and (b) do not
consider the noncharacteristic items to be true of
their kinds. However, there may be alternative rea-
sons why children were less likely to accept the
generics that involved noncharacteristic properties.
One possibility is that children’s responses were
influenced by the relative novelty of the noncharac-
teristic stimuli. Children may be less likely to have
heard statements expressing the noncharacteristic
properties of the target categories than statements
expressing their characteristic properties, which
may in turn make children less likely to agree with
these less familiar items. Although a stringent test
of this possibility would require a study with novel
categories, at least one aspect of the current study
suggests that novelty effects cannot account for
children’s responses. Consider the filler items in
Part 2 expressing properties that are characteristic
of both genders (e.g., ‘‘Do boy ⁄girl tigers have
stripes?’’). It is unlikely that children have previ-
ously heard statements expressing these properties
(because the properties do not vary by gender
and; thus, parents would be unlikely to talk about
the genders separately). Nevertheless, children
responded definitely yes on these items 78.6% of the
time. The fact that children consistently gave defi-
nitely yes responses on questions they have likely
not heard before casts doubt on the possibility that
the novelty of the noncharacteristic stimuli led to
their low acceptance levels.
Another possibility is that children provided
fewer definitely yes and more a little yes, a little no
responses on the noncharacteristic items because
they were confused by the structure of these ques-
tions (‘‘Are Xs Ys?’’). To explore this possibility, we
tested an additional 10 children (M = 5.19 years) on
a similar task in which participants responded to
questions that were structurally equivalent to the
noncharacteristic items but varied in whether their
correct answer was yes or no. This task included six
items each for which the correct answer was (a)
definitely yes (e.g., ‘‘Are princesses girls?’’ ‘‘Are
daddy bears boys?’’), (b) definitely no (e.g., ‘‘Are
ladies boys?’’ ‘‘Are mommy ducks boys?’’), and (c)
a little yes, a little no (e.g., ‘‘Are kids girls?’’
‘‘Are baby birds boys?’’), for a total of 18 items. We
reasoned that if children’s responses to the non-
characteristic items were driven by confusion with
the structure of these questions, then children
should encounter the same difficulty on this task.
This was not the case. Although all the items in
the control task were structurally analogous to the
noncharacteristic items in the main study, children
responded appropriately on an average of 78.0% of
trials. Importantly, children had no trouble
responding definitely yes where appropriate, doing
so on 82.4% of items for which it was the correct
response. These data suggest that children’s low
level of definitely yes responses to the noncharacter-
istic items on the central task was not due to the
unusual structure of these items. Note that this con-
trol task also speaks against two additional con-
cerns. First, the animal items (e.g., ‘‘Are daddy
bears boys?’’) rule out the possibility that children
interpreted questions such as ‘‘Are lions boys?’’ to
mean ‘‘Are lions human boys?’’ (This possibility
was remote anyway, as children would presumably
have favored definitely no rather than a little yes, a
little no if they had interpreted the questions in this
way.) Second, this task rules out the possibility that
children had more trouble responding to the non-
characteristic items because they had difficulty
dealing with relations between sets (e.g., relations
between the set of lions, boys, and boy lions; see
Markman, 1989; Piaget, 1952).
A final alternative explanation we considered
was that participants may have responded differ-
ently to the characteristic and noncharacteristic
items as a result of semantic differences due to how
the items were framed. All of the characteristic
items either used the verb to have to attribute a
physical feature to the kind (e.g., ‘‘Do lions have
manes?’’), or else used a verbal predicate to attribute
a habitual action to the kind (e.g., ‘‘Do birds lay
eggs?’’). In contrast, all of the noncharacteristic
items used nominal predicates (i.e., the verb to
be + count noun) to attribute a gender to the kind
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(e.g., ‘‘Are lions boys?’’ ‘‘Are birds girls?’’). This dif-
ference in syntactic frames is potentially problem-
atic if statements about what a kind is carry
different implications than statements about what a
kind has or does.
There is some evidence to suggest that this might
be the case. In particular, several studies have
shown that using nominal versus verbal predicates
to describe a characteristic of an individual influ-
ences judgments about the permanence of that char-
acteristic. For example, Gelman and Heyman (1999)
showed that 5-year-olds judge novel personal char-
acteristics as more stable over time and context
when they are expressed using a nominal predicate
(e.g., ‘‘She is a carrot-eater’’) than when they are
expressed by a verbal phrase (e.g., ‘‘She eats carrots
whenever she can’’; see also Cimpian, Arce, Mark-
man, & Dweck, 2007; Markman, 1989). Likewise,
Reynaert and Gelman (2007) showed that adults
judge physical and mental illnesses described using
nominal predicates (e.g., ‘‘He is a baxtermic’’ and
‘‘He is baxtermic’’) as more permanent and stable
than those described using verbal predicates (e.g.,
‘‘He has baxtermia’’). Thus, when describing charac-
teristics of an individual, nominal and verbal predi-
cates seem to carry different implications.
Of particular interest here is the question of
whether statements about what a kind is versus
what a kind has or does require different amounts of
statistical evidence to be accepted as true. Specifi-
cally, given the permanence and centrality that is
implied when properties are described using nomi-
nal predicates, it may be that more statistical evi-
dence is required to agree with a statement about
what a kind is than to agree with a statement about
what a kind has or does (see Gilson & Abelson,
1965). On this view, participants may have been
less likely to endorse the noncharacteristic than the
characteristic items not because of differences in
whether or not the predicated properties are
viewed as characteristic of their kinds, but rather
because greater statistical evidence is necessary to
endorse statements about what a kind is. To
address this possibility, in Study 2 we examined
children’s responses to characteristic and nonchar-
acteristic item pairs that are both presented with
nominal predicates using the verb to be.
Study 2
As in Study 1, we examined children’s endorse-
ments of items expressing properties that are char-
acteristic of the kind yet true of only one gender, as
well as of items that are not characteristic of the
kind yet also true of only one gender. However, to
control for the possibility that the item effects
observed in Study 1 were driven by semantic differ-
ences due to how the characteristic and noncharac-
teristic items were framed (about what a kind is vs.
what a kind has or does), in this study both the char-
acteristic and noncharacteristic items were framed
in terms of what the kind is. For example, to match
the noncharacteristic item ‘‘Are lions boys?’’ the
characteristic item ‘‘Do lions have manes?’’ was
replaced with ‘‘Are lions animals with manes?’’ If, as
argued, children’s responses in Study 1 were driven
by whether or not the predicated properties are
viewed as characteristic of their kinds, then children
should again be more likely to endorse generics that
express characteristic than noncharacteristic proper-
ties, even when both types of items are presented
with nominal predicates using the verb to be.
Method
Participants
Twelve children (5 males, 7 females; M =
5.10 years, SD = .47) participated. Four additional
children were excluded because they did not know
any of the gender properties. The children, all of
whom were recruited in a small Midwestern city,
were predominantly European American and came
from a range of socioeconomic backgrounds.
Materials and Procedure
Part 1. Children evaluated the truth or falsity of
12 items. Eight of the items were based on the four
characteristic and noncharacteristic item pairs with
which children from Study 1 were most familiar
(see Table 1 for a full list). In addition, there were 4
filler items (2 characteristic, 2 noncharacteristic).
Every child answered all or all but one of the filler
items correctly. Importantly, all items used nominal
predicates using the verb to be (e.g., characteristic:
‘‘Are lions animals with manes?’’; noncharacteristic:
‘‘Are lions boys?’’; filler: ‘‘Are tigers animals with
stripes?’’). All other aspects of the design were
identical to Study 1.
Part 2. Part 2 was designed to test participants’
knowledge of the gender requirements for the
characteristic properties in Part 1 (e.g., that only
male lions have manes). This section was identical
in structure to Part 2 of Study 1; however, only
the four characteristic properties from Part 1 and
four filler items were examined. If participants
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responded incorrectly to a Part 2 question, that item
pair was excluded from their Part 1 data. Children
demonstrated knowledge of the gender require-
ments for roughly half of the properties tested
(M = 1.83 of 4 possible). (It is unclear why children
did not respond appropriately to more of the Part 2
items. The most common error was choosing defi-
nitely yes in response to questions about both male
and female category members [M = 1.38 of 4 possi-
ble], potentially suggesting that these participants,
who were somewhat younger than those in Study
1, had not yet learned how males and females differ
on some of the characteristic properties.)
Results
Our central analysis involved the proportion of
definitely yes responses for the characteristic and
noncharacteristic items. We conducted an ANOVA
with item type (characteristic, noncharacteristic) as
a within-subject variable. The dependent variable
was a proportion score based on the number of
times participants selected the definitely yes
response out of the total number of item pairs on
which they demonstrated requisite knowledge in
Part 2. Results revealed the predicted main effect of
item type, F(1, 11) = 17.33, p = .002, gp
2 = .61. As
shown in Table 2, children gave significantly more
definitely yes responses for characteristic than non-
characteristic items. This pattern held for 8 of 12
children, p = .008 (sign test).
Additional analyses were conducted to compare
the proportion of definitely yes responses against
rates expected by chance (.33; see Table 2). As pre-
dicted, for the characteristic items children selected
the definitely yes response at rates greater than
expected by chance, t(11) = 5.54, p < .001. In
contrast, children selected the definitely yes response
for the noncharacteristic items at chance levels,
t(11) = )0.30, p = .77.
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the
possibility that participants were more likely to
agree with the characteristic than the noncharacter-
istic items in Study 1 because of semantic differ-
ences due to how these items were framed (i.e., as
claims about what a kind has or does versus claims
about what a kind is). Thus, in Study 2, children
were asked to judge characteristic and noncharac-
teristic items that were both framed in terms of
what the kind is (e.g., ‘‘Are lions animals with
manes?’’ vs. ‘‘Are lions boys?’’). We found that
even when the characteristic and noncharacteristic
items were framed in the same way, children were
still significantly more likely to endorse generics
that express characteristic than noncharacteristic
properties. Together with the results of Study 1,
these findings lend further support to our claim
that when deciding on the truth value of a generic
statement, what matters most is not the statistical
prevalence of the property, but rather whether or
not that property is viewed as characteristic of the
kind.
General Discussion
This article explored whether young children
understand generic meaning as distinct from quan-
tification. We compared children’s responses to
questions about properties that, although roughly
equivalent in prevalence (each applying to approxi-
mately 50% of kind members), differed in whether
or not they are considered by adults to be generi-
cally true of the kind (e.g. ‘‘Do lions have manes?’’
or ‘‘Are lions animals with manes?’’ vs. ‘‘Are lions
boys?’’). As predicted, children were more likely to
accept generics that express characteristic than
noncharacteristic properties. These data expand
upon the growing literature concerning children’s
comprehension of generics (e.g., Cimpian & Mark-
man, 2008; Gelman & Bloom, 2007; Gelman &
Raman, 2003; Hollander et al., 2002) in two ways.
First, our findings suggest that children recognize
that generic facts can be considered true even if
they are not true of all or even most members of a
category (e.g., ‘‘Lions have manes’’). Second, our
data suggest that children recognize that some gen-
eric statements can be considered untrue even if
they express properties that are fairly frequent (e.g.,
‘‘Lions are boys’’). Overall, the data presented here
provide the first direct evidence that, like adults,
young children do not interpret generics as state-
ments about the number or proportion of individ-
ual category members that possess a particular
property. Our data reveal instead that, even for
young children, generics make claims about kinds.
These findings also speak to an ongoing debate
about the nature of children’s concepts. There is
now substantial evidence to suggest that adults’
concepts cannot be characterized by statistical
information alone; they are better characterized as
theory-like explanatory structures that incorporate
not only knowledge about shared features (includ-
ing nonobvious ones) but also causal–explanatory
links between those features (e.g., Ahn, Flanagan,
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Marsh, & Sanislow, 2006; Murphy, 2002; Rips &
Collins, 1993). The data presented here are consis-
tent with the notion that the concepts of young chil-
dren also consist of more than just statistical
regularities (see also Gelman, 2003; Gopnik &
Schulz, 2004; Keil, 2006). Young children’s interpre-
tation of generic sentences reveals that they treat
certain categories, including the animal categories
examined here, as abstract generic kinds.
Of course, both statistical information and
abstract conceptual knowledge likely play a role in
children’s reasoning about kinds (e.g., Prasada &
Dillingham, 2006, 2009). In fact, the current experi-
ments provide some evidence that both children
and adults also recognize and consider the role
of prevalence information in evaluating the truth
of generic statements. Consider participants’
responses to the noncharacteristic items (e.g., ‘‘Are
lions boys?’’). Both children and adults avoided the
definitely no response on these items in favor of the
less definitive a little yes, a little no answer choice.
This response may reflect participants’ awareness
that the noncharacteristic properties are true of at
least some individuals within the target kinds. By
selecting the a little yes, a little no response, partici-
pants were able to convey their knowledge of the
prevalence of the noncharacteristic properties while
still denying that these properties characterize the
kind. This pattern of results is consistent with the
view that although children do not rely on preva-
lence considerations alone when evaluating state-
ments about kinds, they nonetheless do not ignore
the statistical evidence. An important question for
future research is how children’s statistical learning
mechanisms (e.g., Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996)
interact with their abstract conceptual knowledge
and their finely tuned causal reasoning abilities
(e.g., Gopnik & Schulz, 2007) to support conceptual
development (see Sobel & Kirkham, 2007; Tenen-
baum, Griffiths, & Kemp, 2006).
An additional important question this work raises
concerns the nature of the differences between prop-
erties that can and cannot be truthfully predicated
of a kind. The question of what makes a property
generically true of a kind does not yet have a precise
answer. According to one view (Prasada & Dilling-
ham, 2006, 2009), there are two circumstances under
which it may be legitimate to predicate a property of
an entire kind: (a) when a property is highly preva-
lent among kind members and (b) when a property
has a ‘‘principled connection’’ with the kind—that
is, when instances possess the feature by virtue of
being the kinds of things they are (e.g., dogs bark
because barking is part of what it means to be a
dog).
Which properties are linked to their kinds in this
principled way? A number of candidate property
types have been proposed. For example, properties
may be predicated generically if they fit dimensions
specified by overhypotheses (e.g., each kind of ani-
mal has a characteristic diet, sound, mode of repro-
duction; Shipley, 1993; see Leslie, 2007, 2008).
Relatedly, properties that fit with people’s naı¨ve
causal theories about the relevant kinds have been
shown to be accepted when predicated in generic
form (Cimpian, Gelman, et al., 2010; Gelman &
Bloom, 2007). Leslie (2007, 2008) has proposed that
properties that are especially striking or dangerous
(e.g., ‘‘Sharks attack swimmers’’) may also be pred-
icated generically if they are viewed as part of a
kind’s natural disposition (see also Cimpian, Bran-
done, et al., 2010). However, as Leslie (2007, 2008)
points out, a property cannot be correctly predi-
cated of a kind if there is an equally salient, posi-
tive alternative property that applies to other
members of the kind. For example, ‘‘Lions are
boys’’ may be considered false because female lions
possess an equally salient alternative property (i.e.,
being female). In contrast, ‘‘Lions have manes’’
may be considered true because female lions lack
this property and do not exhibit a salient competing
feature. Overall, these proposals begin to address
the important question regarding which sorts of
properties get linked to their categories in princi-
pled ways, which get linked to their categories via
prevalence alone, and why. Further work, includ-
ing developmental research, on these questions is
needed. In particular, research on how children
learn which properties are principled versus not
and on the potential role of parental input in this
learning process (e.g., Gelman, Coley, Rosengren,
Hartman, & Pappas, 1998; Gelman, Taylor, &
Nguyen, 2004) may be especially informative.
To conclude, our findings demonstrate that for
children, as for adults (Cimpian, Brandone, et al.
2010; Cimpian, Gelman, et al., 2010; Khemlani
et al., 2007; Khemlani et al., 2009), generic meaning
does not reduce to considerations of how many
individuals have the relevant property. Even when
children know how prevalent the relevant proper-
ties are among category members, they do not use
this knowledge as the sole basis for evaluating the
truth of generic statements. Rather, considerations
about whether generically predicated properties are
characteristic of their kind play a deciding role in
children’s reasoning about generic sentences.
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